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MAF Blogger Danny
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WALL STREET JOURNAL PUBLISHES EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS FROM OUR FRIENDS KIM AND FRED KAGAN!

Today in the Wall Street Journal is an amazing article written by Kim and Fred Kagan from The Institute for the Study of War. Titled “How PM Maliki Pacified Iraq,” the article reads as an extensive and detailed narrative of Iraqi and American operation in Iraq from the end of 2006 through the present.

Its really interesting to read about the Iraqi side of the operations, which we don’t always get a full picture of because typically news stories seem tailored to the American side of operations.

The most interesting part of the article to me was about Operation Knight’s Charge, the now-famous operation to combat the Madhi army in Sadr City that Maliki went forward with, without really notifying US forces, then needed our help, so we scrambled some air strikes and backup to bolster his forces.

Operation Knight’s Charge started on March 25, as Iraqi Security Forces moved into Mahdi Army (JAM) safe havens throughout the city. Initial operations were not promising – some 1,000 ISF personnel deserted or refused to fight, most of them from the newly formed 14th Iraqi Army Division. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army seized control of the port.

Initial setbacks did not deter Mr. Maliki, who continued to send in reinforcements, including Iraqi Special Forces, Iraqi helicopters and the Quick Reaction Force of the 1st Iraqi Army Division from Anbar. Negotiations between Iraqi leaders and Iranian Brig. Gen. Ghassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, produced a “cease-fire” on March 30.

But operations continued, and after two weeks the ISF, with American advisers and aviation but no American combat units, launched clearing operations throughout the city on April 12. By mid-May, the ISF controlled Basra’s neighborhoods, and drove JAM and Special Groups fighters out of their safe havens, pursuing them north and south of the city.

Mr. Maliki had authorized the recruitment of 2,500 local security volunteers and begun negotiating with their tribal leaders for their incorporation into the ISF. The establishment of Iraqi government control in Basra was symbolized by the recapture of state buildings and open areas that had been occupied by various Sadrist and other insurgent groups, and by the seizure of enormous weapons caches.

At the time it was seen as a blow to Maliki’s power, and the ISF’s level of combat readiness. But what most failed to understand was that this operation WAS an overall success as well as a notable milestone as being planned exclusively by Iraqi Security Forces.

Read the full article here: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305438938259017.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries